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EvidenceCorner | Dying Declarations
By Cynthia Ford
Montana, like the federal system, has a hearsay exception for 
“dying declarations.” If the out-of-court declarant is unavailable 
for trial, either by death or some other 804(a) reason1, his/her 
out-of-court statement may be admissible despite a hearsay 
objection if both of two requirements are met:
1.  At the time the declarant made the statement, 
she believed that her death was imminent 
AND
2. Th e statement concerns the cause or 
circumstance of that impending death.
Th ere are two primary explanations for the admissibility of 
this sort of hearsay.  One is religiously-based: if you are about 
to die, and you believe in any form of judgment aft er death, you 
would be least likely to lie at the very moment that judgment is 
upon you.  I always picture the declarant lying on his deathbed, 
able to see the tunnel of light and perhaps St. Peter at the gate at 
the end of it, and deciding that it would be a bad time to add a 
lie to the list of sins already on the book.  Even if you are not a 
fi rm believer, Pascal’s utilitarian “wager” for belief in God may 
make sense now, and even more on your deathbed:
Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved 
in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the 
two cases: if you win, you win everything: if you 
lose, you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then: wager 
that he does exist. 2 
1  This is the title of William Faulkner’s seventh novel, which in turn was taken 
from Homer’s Odyssey. Agamemnon is speaking to Odysseus: “As I lay dying, the 
woman with the dog’s eyes would not close my eyes as I descended into Hades.” 
(Ok, used my fi rst major, English. Stand by for the Philosophy component.)
1  A common misconception is that the declarant must have actually died soon 
after making the statement.  This was apparently true under the prior Montana 
statute, but the Commission Comment indicates this was abandoned on adoption 
of the MRE provision.  Now, in both state and federal court, a dying declaration 
may be admissible even if the declarant later miraculously recovered, so long 
as he believed that he was about to die at the time he made the statement.  Al-
though 804(a) requires unavailability at trial before any of the 804(b) exceptions 
can succeed, the declarant can be unavailable by refusing to testify despite a court 
order, asserting a privilege, being too sick, or simply failing to appear despite the 
best eff orts of the proponent.  Of course, death is another—and the clearest—
form of unavailability under 804(a), but the death can either be caused by the 
circumstance which gave rise to the belief of impending death, or something else 
altogether.
2  Pascal, Blaise, 1670, Pensées, translated by W. F. Trotter, London: Dent, 1910.  
There is a host of secondary sources which will explain far more accurately and in 
far more detail Pascal’s analysis.  I recommend, as one starting point, http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/#4 See also, 
At last, my second major in Philosophy is somewhat relevant!
If you are more interested in modern rappers than old dead 
Frenchmen, you may prefer the version from Kendrick Lamar3:
I’d rather not live like there isn’t a God
Th an die and fi nd out there really is
Th ink about it
Th e second rationale oft en expressed for the dying 
declaration exception is that a person about to die doesn’t 
have much skin left  in the game, and stands neither to profi t 
nor lose from telling a lie just before he dies.  Both this, and 
the religiously based rationale, are wide open to rebuttal and 
criticism, but the exception lives on.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has alluded to the dying declaration as an example of a 
“fi rmly rooted” hearsay exception4, and several of its recent cases 
on the Confrontation Clause contain dicta indicating that dying 
declarations may escape the 6th Amendment altogether because 
of their special status.
Montana vs. Federal Dying Declaration Exceptions
Montana recognized the dying declaration exception for 
criminal cases at common law and then by statute5 prior to 
the M.R.E..  When the Supreme Court adopted the M.R.E. 
in 19776, largely based on the F.R.E., Montana consciously 
chose to expand its version of this hearsay exception beyond 
the federal model.  If the out-of-court declarant is unavailable 
for testimony at trial for one of the reasons set forth in 804(a), 
M.R.E. 804(b)(2) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for:
(2) Statement under belief of impending 
death. A statement made by a declarant while 
believing that the declarant›s death was imminent, 
concerning the cause or circumstance of what the 
declarant believed to be impending death.
Th e federal version of this rule is F.R.E. 804(b)(2):
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent 
3  http://rapgenius.com/Kendrick-lamar-faith-lyrics#note-159794
4  See, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 72 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring); Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (recognizing dying declaration as one category of 
hearsay which “rest[s] upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any 
evidence within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protec-
tion.’”
5  Section 93-401-27(4), R.C.M. 1947.
6  Like virtually all of the M.R.E., 804(b)(2) is substantively identical to the original 
version adopted by Supreme Court Order in 1976, eff ective July 1, 1977.  
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Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a 
civil case, a statement that the declarant, while 
believing the declarant’s death to be imminent, 
made about its cause or circumstances.
Diff erent from the federal rule, Montana allows use of this 
exception in all cases, both civil and criminal, whereas the 
federal use is restricted to civil and homicide cases. Th e Montana 
Evidence Commission commented: 
Th is exception is identical to Federal and 
Uniform Rules (1974) Rule 804(b)(2) except that 
an introductory clause reading “in a prosecution 
for homicide or a civil action or proceeding”, 
is deleted. Th e Commission deleted this clause 
because it feels that if statements of this sort are 
to be admissible in homicide prosecutions, they 
should also be admissible in any other criminal 
prosecutions. Section 93-401-27(4), R.C.M. 
1947 [superseded], admits dying declarations in 
all criminal actions, and so the adoption of the 
Federal rule would have been a restriction on 
existing Montana law. None of the cases have 
expressed the rule that dying declarations are 
only admissible in prosecutions for homicide, 
although the cases considering admitting dying 
declarations have all been this type of prosecution. 
Note that the Federal, Uniform, and Montana 
rule all admit statements of this sort in civil 
actions; this is a major change from the common 
law. Th e Commission feels that if statements of 
this sort are reliable enough for use in criminal 
prosecutions, then they should also be used in 
civil cases where the outcome does not involve 
personal freedom. (Emphasis added).
Th ere were no Montana cases dealing with dying declarations 
in a civil context before the M.R.E. were adopted, presumably 
because the antecedent statute was confi ned to criminal cases. 
Furthermore, despite the invitation of the Montana Commission 
to extend use of this hearsay exception to all cases, that has not 
yet occurred in any case appealed to the Montana Supreme 
Court since 1977.
ONLY ONE MONTANA STATE DYING 
DECLARATION CASE SINCE 1977, 
AND IT IS CRIMINAL
Th e only 804(b)(2) case from the Montana Supreme Court 
since the M.R.E. were adopted was decided in 2008.  Raul 
Sanchez shot and killed his girlfriend, Aleasha Chenowith, 
apparently because she had cheated on him with his co-worker.  
At Sanchez’s trial, the prosecutor was allowed to introduce a 
note written by Aleasha, apparently several days before she was 
killed.  Th e note read:
To whom it concerns:
On July 8, 04 around 10:30 p[sic] Raul Sanchez 
Cardines told me if I ever was cought [sic] with 
another man while I was dating him, that he 
would kill me. Raul told me he had friends in 
Mexico that had medicine that would kill me and 
our doctors wouldn’t know what it was till it was 
to [sic] late and I would be dead.
So if I unexspetly [sic] become sick and on the 
edge of death, and perhaps I die no [sic] you will 
have some answers.
Aleasha Chenowith (written and printed 
signature)
Th e trial court admitted this exhibit over the defendant’s 
hearsay objection7, holding that this note fell within the dying 
declarations exception in 804(b)(2), as well as two other hearsay 
exceptions.  Th e trial judge also overruled the defense objection 
to a neighbor’s testimony about an oral statement Aleasha 
made to her:
Pamela Ehrlich testifi ed that Aleasha told her 
that, during an argument, Sanchez stated, “[m]e 
love you, [Aleasha]. Me not love you that much. 
You cross me, I kill you.”
On appeal, the State argued that both the note and the 
oral statement were dying declarations and thus admissible.  
Th e Montana Supreme Court made short shrift  of this 
argument about both types of evidence, applying the express 
requirements of the exception and fi nding that neither met 
these requirements: 
the District Court incorrectly relied on the 
“statement under belief of impending death” 
hearsay exception to admit Aleasha’s note. 
Th is exception applies to statements “made by 
a declarant while believing that the declarant’s 
death was imminent, concerning the cause or 
circumstance of what the declarant believed to be 
impending death.” M.R. Evid. 804(b)(2). Aleasha’s 
statements that “if I [unexpectedly] become sick” 
and “perhaps I die” indicate that she viewed her 
death as neither certain nor imminent. (Emphasis 
original.)
State v. Sanchez, 341 Mont. 240, 247-248, 177 P.3d 444, 
2008 MT 27.  Th e Court also found that nothing in the oral 
7   The defendant also objected to the note on Confrontation Clause grounds, but 
the trial judge never ruled on this objection.  The Montana Supreme Court held 
that Aleasha’s note was “testimonial” even though it was not made directly to a 
law enforcement offi  cer, and that although its admission might violate the state 
and federal confrontation clauses, Sanchez forfeited his right to object on those 
grounds when he murdered Aleasha.  341 Mont. at 257.  But see, Giles v. California, 
554 U.S. 353 (2008) (holding that the U.S. 6th Amendment right is forfeited only 
when the defendant’s wrongful act was intended to prevent the declarant from 
testifying against the defendant.) 
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statement indicated fear of imminent death at the time Aleasha 
was speaking to her neighbor.  Th us, the Court found, the trial 
judge committed two evidentiary errors when it admitted these 
forms of hearsay.  (Th e Court went on to hold that both errors 
were harmless, in view of other evidence properly admitted 
on the same point, including Sanchez’s own statements of his 
intention to either slap Aleasha around or shoot her.)
Th e M.R.E. were adopted the year before I graduated from 
law school, so we are almost the same legal age.  In that time 
(a lot of time), M.R.E. 804(b)(2) has been the subject of only 
one case in the Montana Supreme Court.  Th at case, Sanchez, 
was criminal.  Despite the Commission’s intention to open the 
use of dying declarations to civil as well as criminal litigants, 
no civil cases in Montana’s state courts appear to have taken 
advantage of the extension.  
A POST-RULES 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT CIVIL CASE
Th e U.S. District Court for the District of Montana decided 
a very interesting and illuminative dying declaration case in 
1999, Sternhagen v. Dow Chemical, 198 F.Supp. 2d 1113.  (It 
was a civil case, to boot). Th e plaintiff  had grown up to become 
a board-certifi ed radiation oncologist, but as a teenager he 
had worked three summers mixing and spraying herbicides 
on fi elds of crops.  Th irty years later, he was diagnosed with 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he believed was caused by his 
exposure to the herbicide chemicals.  On August 22, 1988, he 
fi led a products liability complaint in federal court.  
Eight days later, he gave a sworn videotaped statement 
“upon questioning from his attorney.”  Th e defendants were 
not notifi ed of this event at the time, and had no opportunity to 
cross-examine Dr. Sternhagen.  In the statement,
Sternhagen said he could recall four labels on 
the 2, 4–D barrels with which he worked while 
employed with Valley Flyers and the Fuhrman 
Ranch. Th e four were Dow, Ortho (Chevron), 
Monsanto and Stauff er, i.e., the defendants in this 
action. Sternhagen also described, inter alia, how 
his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was in “stage four,” 
the disease’s fi nal stage and the point at which 
the disease is considered incurable. He stated, 
based upon his experience as a doctor with other 
cancer patients, that the average survival time for 
a person in his condition was three months, and 
survival of six months would be considered “quite 
outstanding.” Sternhagen said he had received the 
sacrament of Last Rites from the Roman Catholic 
Church about 25 times since he was diagnosed as 
a step to prepare himself for death.
108 F.Supp.2d at 1115.  
Clearly, Dr. Sternhagen’s attorney had read the dying 
declarations rule and was trying to lay the foundation for the 
posthumous use of the statement at trial.  
Dr. Sternhagen did die before trial8, and before the 
defendants moved for summary judgment.  Th e plaintiff s 
submitted the sworn statement in opposition to summary 
judgment, to prove the truth of the facts it asserted, as the 
primary basis for liability of the four named defendants: 
Q: Do you recall, I realize we are going back 
almost exactly 40 years—?
A: Yes, sir.
Q:—but, as you sit here now, do you recall any 
labels on the 2, 4–D barrels?
A: I believe I can recall four labels. Th ose four 
would be Dow, Ortho, Monsanto and 
Stauff er, as best as I can recollect.
Q: And those would all be suppliers of the 2, 
4–D which you mixed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And which you sprayed?
A: Yes.  
108 F.Supp.2d at 1116. 
 Judge Hatfi eld found that the statement conformed to 
federal precedent that descriptions of ingested substances 
adequately “concern the cause or circumstances” of the 
imminent death.  However, the judge held that the other 
requirement of the exception, that the declarant believe at the 
time of making his statement that his death was “imminent,” 
was not met in this case.   He quoted the following language 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s best-known dying declaration 
case, Shepard v. U.S., 290 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1933):
[T]he declarant must have spoken without 
hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending 
death.... Fear or even belief that illness will end 
in death will not avail itself to make a dying 
declaration. Th ere must be ‘a settled hopeless 
expectation’ that death is near at hand, and what 
is said must have been spoken in the hush of its 
impending presence.... What is decisive is the 
state of mind. Even so, the state of mind must 
be exhibited in the evidence, and not left  to 
conjecture. Th e patient must have spoken with the 
consciousness of a swift  and certain doom.
Mrs. Shepard’s statement to her nurse about her belief that 
her husband had poisoned her was disqualifi ed because about 
the same time, Mrs. Shepard had experienced an improvement 
in her physical condition, and had asked her doctor “you 
will get me well, won’t you?”  Th e U.S. Supreme Court held 
that these facts contraindicated the required “settled hopeless 
expectation” and rendered the statement inadmissible.
8  The parties had agreed to take Dr. Sternhagen’s deposition on December 14, 
but he died on December 4, before that could occur.
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Dr. Sternhagen fared no better.  Despite the great “I am 
positive I am going to die, and soon” language in his statement, 
his post-statement conduct made the hearsay objection for the 
defendants.  Remember that he gave his statement on August 
30, 1988, and prior to that date had had last rites administered 
about 25 times.  Th e fatal (sorry) facts occurred aft er that date:
In this court’s opinion, Sternhagen’s statement 
does not fall within the dying declaration 
exception. When he made the statement, he 
stated he expected to live another three to six 
months. He also said he continued to work in 
a limited way and stated his plans to attempt 
more work if his condition improved. Th ese are 
not the type of statements that support a belief 
in “imminent” death, as contemplated in Rule 
804(b)(2). Th ey do not convey a state of mind 
exhibiting “consciousness of a swift  and certain 
doom” and thus do not provide suffi  cient indicia 
of trustworthiness to satisfy the dying declaration 
exception to the hearsay rule. Additionally, his 
act of taking a trip to a religious shrine to “receive 
healing” does not support the notion of a “settled 
hopeless expectation” that his death was near at 
hand. For these reasons, the court fi nds the dying 
declaration exception inapplicable to Sternhagen’s 
statement.
108 F.Supp.2d at 1118.  
(Th e court also rebuff ed the plaintiff ’s attempt to get the 
statement in through the “residual” exception of F.R.E. 807.9)  
It is hard to say if there was anything else plaintiff ’s counsel 
could or should have done to try to preserve Dr. Sternhagen’s 
identifi cation of the toxins, and it is certainly impossible to 
counsel your dying clients that they should forsake additional 
treatment because it might interfere with your evidentiary 
strategy.  We don’t make the facts, which is one of the hardest 
things to accept about lawyering…  
ILLUSTRATIVE PRE-RULES DYING 
DECLARATION CASES IN MONTANA
My research10 revealed about 20 published cases in Montana 
decided before M.R.E. 804(b)(2) went into eff ect.  All of them 
are criminal cases.  I have selected just two to discuss here, 
one of which is my favorite11 of all the dying declaration cases 
I have ever read, both because of its colorful facts and because 
it shows the paradigmatic application of the exception.  Th e 
other case shows a reversal for an improper admission of a 
hearsay statement which did not meet the requirements of the 
exception.  Taken together, these two cases provide a good 
9  Montana has retained two versions of this “catch-all” exception as 803(24) and 
804(b)(5); there is no M.R.E. 807.
10  See, “A Word/Warning about Research,” below.
11  This is also the case the Montana Commission discussed (in much less detail, 
more’s the pity) in its Comment to 804(b)(2): “The leading case considering this 
foundation is State v. Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 30, 306 2d 679 (1956), in which the 
Court reviewed most of the Montana cases in this area.”
diagram of the proper use of this hearsay exception in Montana.
Dying declarations in spades
Sadly, I can only excerpt a small portion of this case, but I 
hope it will be enough to induce you to read more of State v. 
Morran, 131 Mont. 17, 306 P.2d 679 (1957) sometime soon.  
All was not well at Buster Morran’s gas station in Malta.  He 
was already way behind in paying for his gas and oil, as well as 
his rent, and the lessor was going to cancel his lease in August.  
He had not had fi re insurance, but bought and paid for a new 
policy, eff ective June 11.  At 1:00 a.m. on June 19, Buster went 
to his bookkeeper’s house and dropped off  the bank deposit 
from the day before, as well as the books, some adding machine 
tapes, and other records.  At 2:45 that same morning, June 20, 
a fi re broke out at the gas station.  Not surprisingly, the fi re 
marshal later determined it had been set.  
Unfortunately, Morran did not act alone in the arson.  
Shortly aft er the fi re started, the whole station exploded, and 
two men ran out of the building.  Th ey were Mervin Bishop 
and “Turk” or “Turkey” Freestone (see why I love this case?).  
Both were taken to the hospital.  When they arrived, Bishop was 
85% covered with 3rd degree burns, and Freestone was almost 
100% covered with the same.  Freestone died less than 12 hours 
aft er the explosion; Bishop lived until the aft ernoon of June 23 
(about 3 ½ days).  Th e treating physician at the hospital for both 
men was none other than the father of the Hon. Donald Molloy. 
Dr. Molloy testifi ed at the trial, both establishing the foundation 
for the dying declarations and recounting those declarations. 
Here is the testimony of Dr. Molloy which established the 
foundation for the declarations:
‘Mervin Bishop asked me what was the 
condition of Turk Freestone. I informed him 
that Turk Freestone died shortly aft er they were 
admitted to the hospital, and he said, ‘Am I 
burned as badly as Turk?’ I said, ‘Not quite, but 
just about as bad, Merv.’ He said, ‘Am I going to 
live, Doc?’ I said, ‘No, Merv, you are not.” …
On Monday evening, June 20, 1955, Mervin 
Bishop said to Dr. Molloy, ‘I am going to die’. 
Bishop also made a statement to his friend, 
Clinton Dennis, which was overheard by Dr. 
Molloy to the eff ect that he (Bishop, a former 
boxer) was ‘going down for the long count.’
Th e local priest also testifi ed at the trial to reinforce the fact 
that the declarant knew his death was imminent:
Within a few hours aft er the fi re a Catholic 
priest was summoned to the hospital and the last 
rites of the church were administered to both 
Mervin Bishop and Donald Freestone. Th e priest, 
before administering the last rites to Mervin 
Bishop, received his confession. Th e testimony of 
the priest given at appellant’s trial indicated that 
Mervin Bishop was able to respond intelligently 
to the priest’s statements and that the injured 
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man seemed to understand the solemnity of the 
ceremony being performed.
With this foundation, Dr. Molloy was allowed to testify 
about the contents of the statement which Bishop made in his 
hospital room on the Tuesday evening (only part of which I 
reproduce here), indicating that the fi re was orchestrated by 
Morran and that Bishop believed Morran purposely tried to kill 
him and Turk to destroy evidence of the arson.  Bishop said that 
Morran originally contacted Turk, and Turk had Bishop hide in 
the men’s room at the gas station to listen in on the proposition:
Mervin Bishop sneaked into the back room 
and into the men’s rest room. Buster Morran then 
came to the back room with his proposition to 
Turk Freestone. He stated that he would give him 
fi ft y to fi ve hundred dollars, depending on how 
good a job he did on burning down the Hi-Line 
Servicenter. He laid the plans for them…
‘So about 2:30, 2:00 to 2:30 in the morning 
Turk Freestone entered the northwest window of 
the Hi-Line Servicenter and Mervin Bishop stood 
jiggers while Turk Freestone entered. Mervin 
Bishop then followed Turk Freestone through 
the window. Th en instead of setting about their 
business as they were supposed to, Turk went 
to the back room to obtain two tires for his car. 
Aft er he obtained the tires for his car, Mervin was 
standing jiggers at the front door to make sure no 
one came.
‘Turk threw a 15-gallon drum of gasoline 
into the back room as he was instructed, toward 
the water heater. At this point Mervin Bishop 
interjected that Buster was supposed to have 
turned off  the fl ame, the pilot light in the water 
heater, but he did not, and ‘I think he left  it on 
on purpose to catch Turkey and destroy all the 
evidence.’
Th e trial court allowed the admission of Bishop’s hospital 
statements as “dying declarations” under the Montana evidence 
statute then in eff ect.  Th e defendant argued on appeal that the 
fact Bishop had said to one person “If you don’t stop asking 
me questions, you’re going to give me a nervous breakdown” 
indicated that he expected to live.  Th e Supreme Court used the 
appeal as an opportunity to review prior Montana case law on 
this exception to the hearsay rule, observing that:
“…if all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the declarant at the time of 
making the declarations show them to have 
been made under the sense of impending death, 
notwithstanding declarant may not have said he 
was without hope of recovery, or was dying, or 
going to die, then such declarations are admissible 
in evidence.”
131 Mont. at 31, quoting from State v. Russell, 13 
Mont. 164, 168, 32 P. 854, 856 (1893).  
Th e Supreme Court affi  rmed the judge’s admission of the 
dying declaration, and affi  rmed the conviction.  
No go: No sense of impending death at time of the 
statement, even though died the same day
State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 513 P.2d 258 (1973) 
was decided four years before the MRE became eff ective.  
Jack Newman was convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
of his wife, Elsie Newman.  She died in the late aft ernoon in 
an ambulance on her way from Bozeman to Billings.  Early 
that Saturday morning, Mrs. Newman had asked two of 
her neighbors to come over to the house aft er Mr. Newman 
left .  Both neighbors testifi ed at trial that Mrs. Newman told 
them defendant “had beaten her Friday night aft er supper 
and again Saturday morning, and that she was frightened and 
had to get out of the house.”  Aft er these conversations, the 
county attorney came out to the house and, observing the 
wife’s physical condition as well as knowing of her continuing 
diffi  culty with alcohol, took her to the local hospital.  Several 
hours later, at the hospital, Mrs. Newman’s condition 
deteriorated and arrangements were made for her to travel 
to Billings for further treatment.  Th e patient had unexpected 
seizures in the ambulance about halfway to Billings, and died in 
Park City.  At trial, the husband/defendant’s hearsay objection 
was overruled and the neighbors’ testimony about Mrs. 
Newman’s statements was admitted.  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court stated simply:
Th e ‘dying declarations’ exception as stated in 
section 93-401-27, R.C.M.1947, is not applicable 
in the instant case because a ‘sense of impending 
death’ was never demonstrated.
For these errors, and others, the conviction was reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial.
A Quick Look at Dying Declara? ons and the Confronta? on 
Clause 6th Amendment
As the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to enunciate its 
current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,12 it has abandoned 
its former test of “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” 
in favor of a clear requirement of confrontation through 
cross-examination, either at trial or beforehand, of a person 
whose out of court “testimonial” statement is used against the 
accused.  However, a recurring theme is suggestive dicta that 
dying declarations may be exempt from the Confrontation 
Clause because they were so fi rmly accepted before the Founders 
adopted the Bill of Rights.  In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004), the landmark case for modern Confrontation Clause 
application, the Court devoted footnote 6 to the treatment of 
dying declarations:
Th e existence of that exception [dying 
12  The “new” jurisprudence began with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004), and continues apace today.  The criminal bar will be well aware of these 
cases, and the Montana corollaries; the civil lawyers among us may well be, and 
may remain, oblivious, because the 6th Amendment applies only to criminal de-
fendants.
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declarations] as a general rule of criminal hearsay 
law cannot be disputed.  Although many dying 
declarations may not be testimonial, there is 
authority for admitting even those that clearly 
are.  We need not decide in this case whether the 
Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for 
testimonial dying declarations.  If this exception 
must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui 
generis.
541 U.S. at 56, note 6.  In Giles v. California, 554 
U.S. 353 (2008), the Court said:
 … two forms of testimonial statements were 
admitted at common law even though they were 
unconfronted.  Th e fi rst of these were declarations 
made by a speaker who was both on the brink of 
death and aware that he was dying.  Avie did not 
make the unconfronted statements admitted at 
Giles’ trial when she was dying, so her statements 
do not fall within this historic exception.
In Michigan v. Bryant, 181 S.Ct. 1143 (2011), the out of 
court statements of the murder victim, made to police as he lay 
mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot, might have been 
dying declarations which would have forced the Supreme Court 
to actually rule defi nitively on the eff ect of the Sixth Amendment 
on the Confrontation Clause (or vice versa).  Th e victim told the 
police who had shot him; the gunshot wound did in fact cause 
the victim’s death soon thereaft er.  However, 
Th e Supreme Court of Michigan held that the 
question of whether the victim’s statements would 
have been admissible as “dying declarations” was 
not properly before it because at the preliminary 
examination, the prosecution … established the 
factual foundation only for admission of the 
statements as excited utterances…Because of the 
State’s failure to preserve its argument with regard 
to dying declarations, we similarly [to Crawford] 
need not decide that question here.
Bryant, 131 S.Ct., at 1151, note 1. Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent went further:
In Crawford v. Washington… this Court 
noted that, in the law we inherited from England, 
there was a well-established exception to the 
confrontation requirement: Th e cloak protecting 
the accused against admission of out-of-court 
testimonial statements was removed for dying 
declarations.  Th is historic exception, we recalled 
in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008); see 
id., at 361-362, 368, applied to statements made 
by a person about to die and aware that death 
was imminent.  Were the issue properly tendered 
here, I would take up the question whether the 
exception for dying declarations survives our 
recent Confrontation Clause exceptions....
Id, at 1177.  
Th us, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet dealt with a case 
which squarely presented the status of the dying declaration vis a 
vis the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause.  Several state courts 
have, and so far, have followed the Supreme Court’s intimations 
that the Confrontation Clause does not bar dying declarations, 
even where the declarations were testimonial, and even where 
the accused had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 
either at or before trial.  E.g., State v. Beauchamp, 796 N.W. 2d 
780, 788-95 (Wis. 2011), citing a string of other post-Crawford 
state court decisions13.  See also, Peter Nicolas14, ‘I’m Dying to 
Tell You What Happened’: Th e Admissibility of Testimonial 
Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487 
(2010). Montana has not yet ruled on this issue because no dying 
declaration case has been presented to the Supreme Court in the 
past several years. 
MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Article II, Section 24 of Montana’s 1972 Constitution 
provides “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.” Th e 
Montana Supreme Court has held that Montana’s version of 
the Confrontation Clause provides even more protection to the 
accused than the federal version.  State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221, 
290 Mont. 479, 964 P.2d 766.  See also, State v. Mizenko15, 2006 
MT 11, ¶57, 330 Mont. 299 (Nelson, J., dissenting); State v. 
Sanchez, 2008 MT 27, 341 Mont. 240, ¶32.
In State v. Sanchez, discussed above, the prosecutor was 
erroneously allowed to admit two out-of-court statements by the 
murder victim, each identifying the accused as the person who 
probably would kill her.  Th e trial judge held both statements 
(one written and one oral) to be dying declarations, but the 
Supreme Court found that neither indicated any awareness that 
the declarant’s death was imminent, as required by Rule 804b2, 
and thus were inadmissible hearsay.  Th e defense also objected 
at trial on Confrontation grounds, but the trial court never ruled 
on these.  
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court devoted a great 
deal of time and eff ort to the Confrontation claim.  It found 
that Aleasha’s note was indeed “testimonial” and ordinarily 
inadmissible under both the state and federal confrontation 
13  Cobb v. State, 16 So.3d 207, 212 (Fla.App.2009); People v. Gilmore, 356 Ill.
App.3d 1023, 293 Ill.Dec. 323, 828 N.E.2d 293, 302 (2005); Wallace v. State, 836 
N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); State v. Jones, 287 Kan. 559, 197 P.3d 815, 822 
(2008); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310–11 (2008); 
People v. Taylor, 275 Mich.App. 177, 737 N.W.2d 790, 795 (2007); State v. Martin, 
695 N.W.2d 578, 585–86 (Minn.2005); State v. Minner, 311 S.W.3d 313, 323, n. 9 
(Mo.App.2010); Harkins v. State, 122 Nev. 974, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (2006); State 
v. Calhoun, 189 N.C.App. 166, 657 S.E.2d 424, 427–28 (2008); State v. Lewis, 235 
S.W.3d 136, 147–48 (Tenn.2007); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 289 n. 20 (Tex.
Crim.App.2009); Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 56 Va.App. 557, 695 S.E.2d 555, 560 
(2010).  
14  Prof. Nicolas teaches law at the University of Washington, and is the author of 
the casebook which I use to teach Evidence at UMLS.
15  The majority opinion in Mizenko noted in passing Crawford’s language foot-
note about the possibility of the dying declaration exemption from the Confronta-
tion Clause, but like Crawford, the out-of-court statement at issue was not a dying 
declaration.  
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clauses because the defendant had had no chance to cross-
examine her.  However, the Court went on to consider and 
eventually agree with the State’s argument that Sanchez’s 
murder of Aleasha extinguished his constitutional rights to 
confrontation, regardless of the motive behind the murder.  
Since Sanchez was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
taken the other tack: in order to forfeit a federal 6th Amendment 
right by wrongdoing, the defendant’s wrongful act must have 
been intended to prevent the declarant/victim from testifying.  
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  Th e Montana Supreme 
Court is free to continue its broader interpretation of the 
grounds for forfeiting the state confrontation right16, of course, 
but must follow Giles’s narrower version of forfeiture when the 
defendant’s claim is based on the 6th Amendment.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, Montana has not yet had to 
face the issue of whether a dying declaration which meets the 
hearsay exception also must survive a confrontation clause 
objection, or whether the Montana Constitution impliedly 
exempts these out of court statements from the right of the 
accused to “meet the witnesses against him face-to-face.” 
A WORD/WARNING ABOUT RESEARCH
For no particular reason, my preferred search engine for 
legal research is WestlawNext.  However, I lately have had 
some disconcerting results, which I thought to share with my 
readers as a cautionary tale.  In researching this article, I fi rst 
typed in “Rule 804 hearsay” and got immediately to M.R.E. 
804, including the text of the rule and the complete set of 
Commission Comments.  I then scrolled down to “Notes of 
Decisions” and saw that there were 125 cases about Rule 804.  
Th ey are categorized according to their subject, so I went to 
the category labeled “Statements Under Belief of Impending 
Death.”  Th ere, I found only one case, the Sternhagen case, 
which technically was decided under the FRE rather than the 
MRE.  I already knew about this case, but I also knew there 
were other Montana dying declaration cases out there.  I 
modifi ed my search, omitting the reference to the rule and 
16  Ironically, the broader approach to forfeiture yields a narrower application of 
the state’s confrontation right, apparently in contrast to the prior cases interpret-
ing the state right as stronger for the defendant than the federal version.
typing simply “dying declarations,” to cover cases decided 
before the M.R.E. were adopted.  Th is approach was much more 
satisfactory, yielding not only the rule but also 24 cases,17 all 
of them from the Montana Supreme Court (and none of them 
Sternhagen).18  Th e third method of research was to go to the 
actual books (remember them?), in this case, West’s Montana 
Code Annotated.19  Th is time, under M.R.E. 804(b)(2), I found 
the same two cases as I found by doing the rule-based search 
electronically.  I looked in the actual “pocket part” supplement 
to update my results, but still did not fi nd the Sanchez case even 
though it clearly was decided under 804(b)(2).  
What’s the moral? Cover all your bases, use your common 
sense.  If you think the search results look thin, look again.  For 
best results, cross-check your electronic results with the hard 
copy.
CONCLUSION
Dying declarations may be “fi rmly rooted” and historic 
exception to the hearsay rule, if not the Confrontation 
Clause.  Montana explicitly included this exception to the 
hearsay prohibition in M.R.E. 804(b)(2), so out of court 
statements made by declarants who believe they are about to 
die, discussing the cause or circumstances of that imminent 
death, are admissible to prove the truth of the matters they 
assert.  However, my review of the use of this hearsay exception 
indicates that it might itself be suff ering from non-use, and in 
danger of wasting away on the vine.  Don’t forget that it is out 
there, and that you can use it in both civil and criminal cases.  
Happy Halloween.
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
17  Not all of the 24 cases actually involved application of Rule 804(b)(2), but at 
least mentioned the term “dying declarations.”  It is a lot easier for me to read a 
case and decide that it is not useful than it is to work not even knowing the cases 
are there.
18  It also indicated that there are 1,657 “secondary sources” on dying declara-
tions. Wow!
19  Actually, I asked the law school’s brilliant research librarian, Cynthia Condit, 
to do this for me.  As always when I need help, and quick, she came through and 
emailed the scan to me at my remote location.  (Who says you can’t write at home 
in your jammies?)
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